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Ladies  and  gentlemen,  dear  friends, 
As  I  said  just now  by  way  of  introduction to  my  talk,  there  seems 
to  me  to  be  little doubt  that  relations  between  the  western  partners 
on  both  sides of  the  Atlantic  have  caught  the  attention of  a  large 
number  of  observers,  at  least  if one  is to  believe what  has  been 
written  in  the  press over  the  last  few  weeks. 
This  could  be  a  purely  transitional  situation brought  about  by 
the  installation of  a  new  administration  in  the  White  House; 
whenever  this  happens  there  is inevitably  a  campaign  portraying 
the  outgoing  administration  as  having  been  too  soft  in  its~foreign 
policy  and,  therefore,  the  new  team  is obliged to project  a  firmer 
line,  particularly  to  the  outside  world.  In  fact,  the periodic 
repetition of  this political  phenomenon  is merely  evidence  of past 
strain  and  friction  between  Americans  and  Europeans  with  roots 
that  go  back  a  long  way. 
Who  can  deny  that  the  confidence  of  Europeans  in  the  savoir-faire 
of  American  statesmen  and  vice  versa  has  been  sapped  considerably 
over  the  past  twelve years, during  which  I  was  able  to observe 
events  from  a  privileged  vantage  point.  At  the  same  time,  we 
Europeans  have  obviously  not  been  in  a  hurry  to take any  real 
responsibility  in  the  face  of  the  crises  we  have  encountered, 
which  has  irritated America's  leaders on  more  than  one  occasion. 
This  trend  is particularly  evident  among  the  younger  generations 
on  both  continents.  America's  prestige  in  Europe  has  been  on  the 
wane,  particularly  since  the  VietNam  war.  Meanwhile,  the  Europeans, 
aware  of  their  economic  potential,  have  been  concentrating  more  on 
their  own  affairs,  and  hence  on  defending  their  own  economic 
interests. 
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In  my  view,  all  this  is due  to  and  would  look  as  the  relative economic 
and  military  decline of  the  United  States  but  what  is  in  fact  a  Less 
important  US  superiority  in  defence  on  USSR  and  a  step  by  step  closing 
of  the  gap  in  economies  between  Europe  and  USA  the  result  of  which  is 
that  the  allies on  this  side of  the  Atlantic  regard  America  with  increased 
mistrust  as  we  enter  a  new  decade,  in  a  world  in  a  state of  crisis and 
subject  to  unprecedentedly  sudden  and  large  changes.  It is only  natural 
that  this  should  make  the  American  Leaders  angry  for  we  should  not 
forget  that,  Leaving  aside  France,  those  same  Europeans  - and  I  am  one 
of  them  - have  done  absolutely  nothing  practical  since  1954  to  achieve 
military  independence. 
~  The  balance  of  power  which  was  the  cornerstone  of  d~tente  h~s been 
upset  and  this  is  undoubtedly  the greatest  upheaval  to  have  been 
experienced  over  the  past decade- one  which  will  continue  to  make 
itself felt  for  some  time  to  come.  The  situation  has  undergone  a 
considerable  crange  since  the  Warsaw  Pact's  superior  arsenal  of 
conventional  weapons  is  no  longer  offset  by  Atlantic  forces'  superior 
nuclear  armaments.  We  can  no  longer  speak  of  a  balance of  imbalances. 
Evers ince  the  Soviet  Union  caught  up  in  the  strategic  arms  stakes 
while  retaining  its  ~ndeniable superiority  in  convetional  weapons 
there  have  been  serious doubts  as  to  whether  the  basic  concept  of 
the  Atlantic  Alliance,  commonly  known  as  the  "strategy of  flexible 
response",  remains  valid  for  the  future. 
Hence,  the  cement  that  has  held  the  Western  camp  together  ever 
since the post-war  reconstruction period  is also  in  danger  of 
crumbling  - I  am  referring  here  to  the  cinviction that  it was  possible 
to  make  a  united  stand  against  a  huge  and  formidable  enemy,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  bloc  it  had  for~ed.  If  we  add  to  this  the  success  of  our 
economies  and  the  prosperity generated  over  the thirty years  since  the 
war  we  are  better equipped  to  understand  how  all  this  has  tended  to 
demobilise  the  generations  that  have  now  taken  over. 1
.:,.; 
- 3  -
The  arms  stricture applies  to  the  climate of detente  created  by  that 
situation which  found  expression,  as  you  know,  in  an  agreement  unhoped 
for  by  some  of  us  - I  mean  the  Helsinki  agreements,  and  which  created 
a  lot  of  illusions  and  recently  deceptions. 
Now  that  the  economic  trend  has  been  wholly  reversed  selfish national 
concerns  have  gained  the  upper  hand  again.  The  difference which  had  been 
smoothed  over  in  the desire to  stand  together  against  totalitarianism 
have  once  again  loomed  large.  Now  that  we  are on  the  brink  of  a  new 
decade  it is  imperative that  serious efforts be  made  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic  to  tackle the  numerous  challenges  facing  us.  With 
your  permission,  I  shall  talk first of  all  about  the  path  the  Europeans 
should  tread  before discussing  our  American  friends.  Since~ have  only 
a  short  time  allotted to  me,  I  shall  concentrate on  essentials. 
So,  as  far  as  the  old  world  is  concerned,  it is  high  time  that  the 
different  states - still at  odds  - stopp.ed  sc;uabbl ing  among  themselves 
for  what  must  be  termed  the  captaincy of  the  second  eleven,  since 
history  has  shown  that  none  of  them  will  ever  succeed  in gaining 
lasting  and  stable  supremacy.  We  must  come  back  as  soon  as  possible 
to  the  project  for  European  Union  which  I  have  been  fighting  for 
the  last  10  years  like  Dr.  Gens~her, the  hope  that  we  shall  be  able 
to  forge  a  union  which  transcends  our  differences,  as  was  envisaged 
by  those  courageous  men  who,  at  the  end  of  the  last war,  understood 
that  it  was  precisely  this  that  had  made  America  so  successful.  It 
is the  only  way  to  end  the  current  chaos,  where  Europe  rarely  speaks 
with  one  voice  and  where  its Member  States are still very  much  inclined 
to  go  it  alone. 
It  is not  surprising  that  my  friend  Henry  Kissinger  Let  out  an  anguished 
cry  "Who  do  I  ring,  when  I  want  to  talk to  Europe?". 1
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Meanwhile,  the  European  states  have  to  convince  their  American  ally 
that  they  are  prepared  to  take  on  their  full  responsibilities.  To  do 
this,  Europe  must  claim  its share  of  military  responsibility and 
restore  credibility  -nthin the  Atlantic  Alliance.  I  should  perhaps 
mention  here  that  I  do  understand  the  reproaches  made  by  the  Americans 
about  the disinclination of  a  good  many  Europeans  to  shoulder  more  of 
the  burden  of  military expenditure.  They  would  rather  shelter  beneath  the 
the  American  nuclear  umbrella  while  criticising it for  its  inadequate 
protection.  Here  I  should  like to  quote  the  figures  recently  published 
in  the  "Economist"  on  annual  per  capita expenditure  on  defence: 
United  States  g  644 
United  Kingdom  g  437 
Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  g  410 
France  g  374 
Denmark  g  274 
Canada  g  177 
Luxemburg  g  134 
and  Japan  g  75 
I  do  not  intend  to expatiate on  these  figures.  They  are  eloquent 
enough  to  illustrate what  I  have  been  saying.  Anyway,  in  my  opinion 
one  of  the  main  tasks  facing  the  Europeans  in  the  years  to  come  will 
be  to  persuade  the  United  States  that  the  North-South  Dialogue  is  a 
worthwhile  exercise.  I  shall  not  dwell  on  the fact  that  our  basic 
economic  interests  and  needs  are  opposed  since  Europe 
has  no  raw  materials  and  is  Largely  dependent  on  these  new  outlets 
as  markets  for  its exports  whereas  the  United  States  has  ample 
natural  resources  and  is  less  interested  in  the  expansion  of  world 
trade.  One  cannot  understand  the  nuances  in  US-Europe  relations  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  if one  forgets 
1)  geographically,  as  well  as  historically  Europe  is much  closer  to 
Africa, 
2)  that  Europe  Lacks  most  and  up  to  80%  of  the  16  most  important  raw 
materials. 
Our  noblest  mission  will  doubtless  be  to  convince  our  American  friends 
that  the  industrialised  and  developing  countries'  destinies  are 1
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inextricably  Linked.  Equipping  the  developing  countries  and  giving 
these  young  nations  the  wherewithal  to  ensure  the  well-being  of  their 
populations  provide  the  Western  industrialised nations  with  unprecedented 
opportunities.  Resolute  action  without  ulterior wotives,  based  on  the 
historical  ties which  many  of  these  nations  have  with  their  former 
mother  countries,  will  constitute the  main  channel  for  any  future 
economic  recovery.  Further:  economic  "revival"  and  world  security 
depends  on  that  means,  personally  I  believe that  what  happened  in 
~ngola, Horn  of  Africa,  Afghanistan,  Iran  now  more  than  ever  to  move 
ahead  to  show  its endeavors  to  cooperate. 
Lastly,  I  should  like  to  add  that  the  international  role of  the 
'  European  Community  should  be  expanded  rapidly.  Given  that  we  are 
vulnerable  because  we  are  dependent  on  outside  sources of  supply 
for  energy  and  other  resources,  and  in  the  face  of  the 
Soviet  Union's  he1emonic  designs,  the  objective  qroun~s for  a  qreater 
cohesion  in  the  old  world  can  also  ~e  regarded  as  valid  reasons  for 
Western  solidarity.  I  do  not  wish  to  beat  about  the  bush  here- it  is 
essential thaf we  get  away  now  from  the  present  state of  affairs 
where  economic  matters  are  considered  to  be  the  Com~unity's responsibility  and 
political  matters  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  Member  States.  Yho  woul~ 
dar~ to  claim that  there  is  no  political  dimension  to  the  excessively 
hiqh  interest  rates  in  the  USA  or  the  sale of  foodstuffs  to  Poland?  It  is 
clear  that  there  is  from  the  nature  of  the· !!feasoJr.es  and  the  repercussions 
they  are  Likely  to  have.  Further  proof  is  provi~ed by  the  fact  that  the 
I..Jestern  economic  summits,.  in  0ttowa  which  we  shall  shortly  be  attending1 were 
originally designed  to  formulate  the  West's  economic  policy guidelines,  but 
now  deal  with  such  fundamental  issues  as  the  balance  between  East  and  West,  the 
role  of  China,  and  so  on.  So,  having  discussed  the  broad  outline of  the  burden 
the  European  nations  will  have  to  bear  in  the  years-~o come  if Western  soli-
darity  is  to  be  strengthened,  I  shall  now  go  on  to  discuss  the  new  approach 
on  which  American  policy  for  the  eighties  shoul~ be  based. 
B.  I  shall  begin  by  making  a  ooint  that  is all  too  frequently  forgotten  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  that  is  that  European  unification  is still 
very  much  in  its  infancy  and  naturally  subject  to teething  troubles • 
. Ironically  enouq~,today it  is  the  Europe~n Community  which  is  the  New  Worlrl, 
younq  and  inexperienced,  in  contrast  to  the  United  States  whose  institutions 
have  proved their  worth  over  more  than  two  hun~red years.  I  am  ?S~inq  my 
American  friends  to  be  patient  and  sometimes  make  allowances  for  us. 
I  should  like  to  raise  another  asoect  of  the  question  here,  and  that  is  the 
Unite~ States  is  all  too  often tryinq  to  tell  us  1-1hich  of  the  Community 
members  it  wants  as  principal  spokesman. 1
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I  have  been  able  to  size  uo  personally  the  adverse  effects  an1  hence  the 
dangers  inherent  in  the  policy  known  as  the  orincipal  nAtion  aooroach.  I 
can  but  repeat  that  the  ~ialoque between  the  two  si~es of  the  Atlantic  must 
not  be  Limited  to  a  special  relationshio  between  the  USA  and  two  or  three 
traditional  European  oowers.  This  aporoach  has  been  ta~en too  frequently 
in  the oast,  and  it  has  encouraged  indifference  on  the  part  of  the  younger 
generations  in  the  medium-siz2d  and  SMall  countries  and  has  even  gone  so  far 
as  to  engender  a  trend  towards  neutralisM.  Certain political oarties  in 
these  st'3tes  and  sometimes  even  in  the  big  potrJers  in  the  1'\lliance,  feel 
they  have  been  Left  out  of  important  events  anrl  already  bear  the  bran~ of  what 
I  described  at  the  recent  Bilderberg  conference  as  the  insidious  gangrene 
which  could  soon  be  eating  away  at  the  whole  continent.  On  the  contrary,  it 
is  especially  important  that  our  relations  be  based  on  a  genuine  oartnership 
with  everyone- no  exceptions  allowed.  I  should  also  like  to  stress  here  the 
importance  we  europeans  attach  to  being  considered  full  partners  rather  than 
satellites - even  though  we  are ourselves  convinced  that  some  partners  are 
not  equal. 
In  this  connection,  if our  American  allies  really  wish  to  restore  the  cre~i­
bility of  the  Atlantic  Alliance  it  seems  to  me  crucial  that  the  military effort 
required  on  both  sides  should  once  again  be  based  on  a  sounder  un~erstanrling. 
This  doubtless  calls  for  better  cooperation  on  e~uioment.  How  can  one  justify 
the  facti that  US  inrlustry  shoulrl  b2  SU;JiJlyinCi  ov?r  R;l%  of \he  ;:cur')r::::!')  ,y'7Ji.e:;' 
military  hardlt!are,  !')articularly tle  heavy  e::;~Ji:;r;Jent  anc  a::-hJ:>nCe'l  ~~C~:-Jol.oqy? 
Generally  speaking,  it  is  UP  to  Presi~ent  ~eagan's government,  given  its 
Leqitinate  desire  to  see  the  A~erican nation  restored  to  an  even  stronger 
position  on  the  chess-board of  world  politics,  to  ~ake sure  that  every  crisis 
that  may  arise  is  not  analysed  exclusively  in  the  Liqht  of  the  East-West 
balance  of  power  The  facts  are  often  more  complex  anrl  the  interests  at  stake 
more  diverse~·  This  is  oarticularly true  ltJhen  we  remer11Jer  that  one  "lajor 
Eurooean  nation  is  cruelly  divider!  by  an  Iron  Curtain.  011r  ~~rr:e>rica'l  frien~s 
must  beware  Lest  the  raw  scar  admit  the  germs  of  neutralism  or  of  "Finlandi-
zation"  and  should  endeavour  to  prevent  the  spread  of  inflJMmation  caused 
by  illusory  hopes.  America  aoparently  has  many  difficulties  to  understand 
that  people  who  have  been  occuoied  by  USSR  troops  anrl  Live  in  the  permanent 
neighbourhOod  have  not  the  same  nature  as  those  who  live  a  thousand  miles 
and  f'lore  a~o<Jay. 
I  shall  now  say  ?  few  words  on  economic  and  trade  relations  between  our 
two  entities.  Although  Less  familiar  to  the  public  at  large,  rlue  to 
the  technicality  these  relations  nevertheless  require  constant  vigilance, 
given  the  climate  of  recession  and  unemployMent.  Insecurity,  mistrust, 
autarkic  withdrawal  and  the  xenoohobic  reflex  are  very  real  dangers  for  the 
future  of  Western  solidarity  and  cohesion.  May  I,  as  the  President  of  the 
ComMission,  in  view  of  the  responsibilities  devolving  frof'l  my  office, 
stress the  absolute  need  to  observe  the  rules  of  Law  which  govern  our 
relations.  Together,  Americans  and  Eurooeans  have proved  in  the  past 
that  they  were  able  to  come  through  many  rlifficulties  hampering  world 
trade.  The  Tokyo  Round  negotiations,  which  were  conrlucterl  by  various 
llniterl  States  Arlrr1inistrations,  have  produced  an  ar'lbitious  IJrogra"lme  of  tAriff 
cuts  over  the  next  ten  years  anrl  the  disMantling  of  non-tariff  barriers. 
The  success  of  these  arrluous,  comolex  anrl  lenqthy  negotiations  rler1onstraterl·~he 
full  potential  of  transatlantic  cooperation.  These  negotiations  also 
expressed  our  common  conviction  anrl  our  attachment  to  free  trarle.  Thus, 
without  seeking  to deal  with  the  petty detail  of  the difficulties  which 
have  ariseh•in  the  past  few  months  between  the  Community  and  the  United 
States,  I  shall  confine  myself  to  pointing  out  that  the  outstanding 
problems  are  too  numerous  and  will  soon  be  too  great  not  to  justify a 
very  serious discussion  between  those politically  responsible. 1 - 7  -
In  referring  to  the  record  of  the  latest  high-Level  consultations  between 
the  Commission  and  the  US  Administration,  I  note  that  the  two  parties 
have  different  views  on  subjects  as  diverse  as  ranging  from  the  relaunching 
of  the  North-South  Dialogue  to  the  excessively  high  interest  rates,  to 
name  but  a  few.  Since  I  became  head  of  the  Brussels  executive  I  hav~ 
sized  up  these  problems,  all  of  which  in  my  view  could  be  subject  to 
compromise  solutions.  Our  mutual  interests alone,  and  that  is  no  small 
matter,  would  stand to gain  a  great  deal.  Every  day  we  put  off  the 
search  for  solutions  to  these  problems  we  risk  eventually  shaRing  one 
of  the  essential  pillars on  which  our  alliance  rests,  namely  a  free 
and  open  trade  system. 
In  reviewing  these  contentious  issues one  is bound  to  wonder  at  the  fact 
there  is  no  real  machinery  for  information  and  consultation  which  would 
facilitate  the  search  for  such  compromise$. 
That  is  what  I  intend  to  talk  about  now,  and  let  me  one  underestimate 
the  importance  of  this delicate  subject  if ever  there  was  one.  I  chose 
to  speak  about  this  matter  because  twice  since  the  beginning  of  the  year 
I  have  been  able  to  see  the  pernicious effects  inevitably engendered  by 
the  lack  of  ongoing  information  and  consultation. 
First  there  was  the,  to  say  the  least,  hasty  reaction of  the  new  Americ~n 
Administration  to  Community  food  aid  for  the  people of  Salvador;  secondly 
there  was  the unilateral  lifting  of  the  cereals  embargo.  In  both  cases 
it  would  appear  that  though  the  information  procedures  worked  well,  they 
proved  inadequate  because  the  information  came  too  late,  was  incomplete 
and  was  not  followed  up.  That  is probably  what  inspired  the title of 
the  article published  in  the  same  weekly  from  which  I  took  the  figures 
referred  to  ~arlier;  a title sufficiently eloquent  not  to  need  any 
comment:  "Did  you  say  Allies?"  ALL  this  is bad  for  us,  for  the  image  of 
partners  in  the  Third  World  and  in  Eastern  Europe. 
It tends  to  be  the  Europeans  who  insist  on  the need  to  be  consulted  and  mostly 
express  their disappointment  at  not  having  been  consulted.  What  then  is  meant 
by  this  ambiguous  idea  of  consultation? 
Some  people  regard  it as  meaning  only  the  need  to provide  information  after 
the  event:  the  policy of  the  fait  accompli.  Conversely,-prior  information 
enables  the  other  party to  react  before  the  deed  is done. 
The  same  distinction  may  be  drawn  regarding  consultations  which  may  be  held 
retrospectively  with  the  possibility of  revising  the fait  accompli  which  is 
the  subject  of  the  consultations;  they  may  be  held  in  advance  but  then  they 
will  be  restricted to  considering  one  another's  arguments  with  a  view  to the 
envisaged  decision,  which  is taken  completely  independently. 
Finally,  there  is  the exercise of  a  real  right  of  inspection,  which  triggers 
off  a  suspensive effect,  and  prior  agreement,  which  totally  rules out  any 
independent  decision-making. 
Still on  the  idea of  consultation,  in  the  speech  I  referred  to  this  morning, 
Henry  Kissinger  distinguished  between  three  completely  separate  fields  of 
action:  military  integration,  economic  cooperation  and  sovereignty over  foreign 
policy.  Kissinger  at  the  time  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  military  security 
provided  by  the  USA  must  inevitably  lead  to the  acceptance  by  the  Europeans  of 
consultations  in  non-military areas,  consultations  which  would  be  similar  to 
those  held  in  the  military  wing  of  the  Alliance,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
return  to  uniform  structures.  This  argument,  commonly  referred  to  as  the 
"Atlantic  Community",  was  rejected  root  and  branch  by  all  the  European  states. 1 - 8  -
The  machinery  of  European  political  cooperation does  not  allow  a  non-
member  state to  be  associated  in  such  cooperation,  any  more  than  it  would 
be  able  to  recognize  that  such  a  non-member  state has  the  right  to  appeal 
against  decisions  which  cause  it problems. 
In  order  to clarify  the  situation,  I  would  say  first  of  all  that,  while 
regular  consultations  between  allies are desirable,  they  can  be  so  only 
on  a  basis  of  reciprocity;  now  there is  the  rub,  as  it  has  to  be  admitted 
that,  given  the  present  state of  relations  between  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
the  principle  cannot  be  applied  in  practice with  an  identical  effect  on  either 
side  for  the  following  reasons  : 
(i)  Until  such  time  as  European  Union  is  complete  the opportunities  in  which 
the  United  States  will  have  to participate,  via  "consultations",  in  the 
formulation  of  new  common  policies  on  the  European  side- and  its  interest 
in  doing so- will  far  outweigh  any  hopes  which  its partners  might  have 
of  influencing  fundamental  decisions  taken  by  the  Americans. 
Cii)  The  structural  imbalance  of  the military alliance  prevents  reciprocity  since 
the  United  States  does  not  in practice admit  that  its  European  allies  have 
more  than  regional  responsibility.  The  many  warnings  reg~rding the  future 
development  of  the  Middle  East  initiative decided  on  by  the  Venice  European 
Council  bear  witness  to this.  Moreover,  the  special  characteristics of· 
nuclear  strategy  restrict the  field and  scope  of  "consultation". 
(iii)  Differences  between  the  American  and  European  constitutional  systems  also 
affect  the  reciprocity of  commitments,  for,  while  consultations  would  to 
some  extent  be  binding  upon  those  involved  on  the  European  side,  who  are 
responsible  for  taking  decisions,  their partners  from  the  US  Administration 
would  often  have  to  refer  them  to  Congress,  which  decides  in  complete 
sovereignty. 
Such  infringements  of  the  principle of  reciprocity  will  have  to  be  considered 
when  choosing  the  appropriate  form  for  consultations  in  order  to  achieve  a 
dialogue  which  is  as  balanced  as  possible. 
Until  the  Member  States  of  the  Community  have  transformed  the  whole  range  of 
their  relations  into  European  Union,  the  three  "Europes"  - the  Europe  of  the 
Community,  the  Europe  of Political  Cooperation  and  the  Europe  of  the  Nation 
States - must  participate  in  the dialogue  with  the  United  States. 
If you  add  to  that  the  fact  that  there  is  no  permanent  administrative  structure, 
by  which  I  mean  a  political  secretariat, it is obvious  why  both  sides  find  it 
difficult to  conceive  at  this  stage of  such  consultations.  But  whatever  solutions 
are  adopted  it must  be  clearly  understood  that  the  Europeans  may,  individually 
or  collectively,  express  views  on  a  particular  problem  which  are  different  from 
those of  the  United  States  and  inevitably draw  the  opposite  conclusions.  This 
should  not  be  regarded  as  a  lack  of  so6darity  nor  be  attributed to  the  present 
procedures  of  European  political  cooperation.  In  the  future  we  shall  still 
have  differences  of  opinion.  Thus  all  our  efforts  should  be  directed  at  updating 
and  making  full  use  of  existing  consultation procedures  with  the  aim  of  finding 
the  maximum  amount  of  common  ground  possible.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  all 
available  means  should  be  used- from  the  tradit~onal diplomatic  channels  to 
periodic  meetings  between  those  who  are  politically  responsible  - always  with 
the  intention of  contacting  the  other  party  before  a  firm  decision  is  taken 
and  announced  publicly. 
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I  shall  state quite  candidly that  the difficulties which  have  emerged  in 
this delicate matter  partly  stem  from  the  fact  that  important  subjects 
must  be  discussed  in  Europe  by  the ministers  concerned  and,  as  you  know, 
once  these  ministers  have  agreed  on  a  common  attitude,  there  is nothing 
to prevent  them  from  informing  the press.  This  publicity,  while  not  always 
clarifying the situation,  hardly  leaves  any  time  for  genuine  consultation 
between  the agreement  on  general  principles  and  the  implementing  decision 
itself. 
The  situation is  somewhat  similar  in the United  States,  where  the  decision-
making  process  is  no  less  complex;  the  corol~ry  is that  once  a  decision 
has  been  taken,  it is  very difficult to  make  changes  in  it. 
Ladies,  Gentlemen, 
My  intention  has  not  been  to give  a  Lecture  to  any  one,  and  even  less  to 
draw  over-hasty  conclusions.  I  hope  that  I  have  contributed to  the  discussions 
by  providing  explanations  which,  in  my  view,  were  necessary.  I  would  ask  you 
to  consider  how  difficult it is  for  six,  then  nine,  now  ten and  tomorrow  twelve 
Member  States  to  work  together  in  concert  with  maximum  efficiency.  Do  not  forget 
that  all  these  States  have  their  own  traditions  and  interests;  if you  add  the 
further  dimension  of  cooperation  between  them  and  the  United 6tates of  America 
you  undoubtedly  raise a  major  problem,  but  at  the  same  time  you  put  your  finger 
on  a  need  which  I  for  my  part  have  always  regarded  as  vital  and  which  has  in-
fluenced  all  my  political activity. 
That  is  why  I  should  like to  conclude  my  speech  by  saying  "Essayons  encore, 
let  us  try again". 